

negative translations and normal modality

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my students who provided a Coq formalization

those who heard ALCOP 2016 talk will see what changed

the more proof-theoretical helped us into FSCD 2017



▶ A **normal modality** \Box is one that distributes over finite meets/products/conjunctions, i.e.,

* algebraically: $\Box(\phi \wedge \psi) = \Box\phi \wedge \Box\psi$ and $\Box\top = \top$

* categorically: monoidal wrt cartesian structure

* deductively: $\vdash \Box(\phi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow \Box\phi \rightarrow \Box\psi$ and $\frac{\vdash \psi}{\vdash \Box\psi}$

The last rule known as **Necessitation** or **Gödel rule**

▶ The resulting extension of the intuitionistic propositional calculus (**IPC**) is denoted as **$i\Box K$**

Let us denote its language by \mathcal{L}_{\Box}


▶ Typically, one has more structure and more **axioms**

We need a general notion


▶ **Normal modal logic**: a subset of \mathcal{L}_{\Box} containing $i\Box K$ and closed under Necessitation, MP and substitution

Algebraically corresponds to a **variety**: an equational class of Heyting algebras with \Box


Later, we'll see a Gentzen/ND-style formulation




some axioms to consider ...




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
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
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
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
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- ▶ One more example: for every x , $\forall x$ is such a \square over IQC (intuitionistic predicate calculus)

- ▶ $\exists x$, meanwhile, is obviously a \diamond

For more on the resulting logic, see A. Prior, R. Bull, G. Bezhanishvili . . .



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- ▶ In the intuitionistic setting, it matters whether or not \diamond is included in the syntax

Not always natural to include in the examples from the previous slide

- ▶ Highlighted notationally: for any $\mathcal{Z} \subseteq \mathcal{L}_{\square}$, $i_{\square}\mathcal{Z}$ is the logic axiomatized by \mathcal{Z}

Other conceivable conventions: $iK_{\square} + \mathcal{Z}$ or $\text{Int}K_{\square} \oplus \mathcal{Z}$.

We use the former for **join** of logics and drop set brackets, i.e.,

write $i_{\square}\mathcal{X} + \zeta$ instead of $i_{\square}(\mathcal{X} \cup \{\zeta\})$

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
write $i_{\square}\mathcal{X} + \zeta$ instead of $i_{\square}(\mathcal{X} \cup \{\zeta\})$

- ▶ Special case: $c_{\square}\mathcal{Z} := i_{\square}\mathcal{Z} + \neg\neg p \rightarrow p$


i.e., logic axiomatized by \mathcal{Z} over the classical propositional calculus (CPC)

- ▶ The lattice of all intuitionistic modal logics includes the lattice of all classical ones as a sublattice


Chapter 3. *Intuitionistic modal logics with provability smax'*
 from L., *Constructive modalities with provability smax'*



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
Given \mathcal{Z} , do negative translations embed faithfully $c_{\square}\mathcal{Z}$ into $i_{\square}\mathcal{Z}$?



Of course the converse will not be expected to hold as A may well be a theorem of IML for some modal reasons invisible to IPL.

This much is uncontroversial, but so far we have hardly constrained IML at all. However, there are other important properties of intuitionistic logic that we might expect to transfer to IML. For example, it is a general feature of intuitionistic logics that the addition of the Law of the Excluded Middle gives rise to the corresponding classical logics. So we might expect:

Requirement 3 The addition of the schema $A \vee \neg A$ to classical modal logic.



CPC

Glivenko, Gödel(-)Gentzen,
Kolmogorov, Krivine(-
Streicher-Reus) ...

IPC


Chapter 3.1 Intuitionistic logic

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


(See, e.g., Ferreira and Oliva or classical refs like Troelstra and van Dalen)


CQC

Glivenko, Kuroda, Gödel(-
)Gentzen, Kolmogorov,
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a precise statement of the problem

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► Consider ζ, ϕ in the intuitionistic modal signature \mathcal{L}_{\Box}

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\mathcal{E}_{EM}
valuation
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► Consider ζ, ϕ in the intuitionistic modal signature \mathcal{L}_{\square}

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We'll make it precise in a second



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- Is it always true that $\phi \in \mathbf{c}_{\Box}\mathbf{K} + \zeta$ iff $\phi^t \in \mathbf{i}_{\Box}\mathbf{K} + \zeta$??
- Quite well-understood for the base system $\mathbf{c}_{\Box}\mathbf{K}$ vs. $\mathbf{i}_{\Box}\mathbf{K}$,
i.e., in the absence of ζ
cf., e.g., Božić and Došen 1984



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- We had to fill it ourselves



what can go wrong ...?

► Everything!

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However, there are other important properties of intuitionistic logic that we might expect to transfer to IML. For example, it is a general feature of intuitionistic logics that the addition of the Law of the Excluded Middle gives rise to the corresponding classical logics. So we might expect:

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See also my forthcoming overview with Jipsen for more



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- ▶ No **recursive** translation from BBI to BI can be adequate



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additional motivation: Simpson's dissertation

Chapter 3. Intuitionistic modal logic

Of course the converse will be a theorem of IML for some modal logics.

This is not true at all. However, we might expect to find logics that the adequate corresponding classical logics. So

- 1. too restrictive: important intuitionistic logics can be trivialized classically**
- 2. too permissive: what if there are "standard" modal logics for which negative translations are not adequate?**

Requirement 3 *The addition of the schema $A \vee \neg A$ to IML yields a standard classical modal logic.*



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
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
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- * natural to formalize in a proof assistant, see our Coq code



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Intuitionistic propositional rules:

$$\begin{array}{c}
 \text{IN} \frac{}{\vdash_{\text{Ni}\square\mathcal{Z}} \phi, \Gamma \Rightarrow \phi} \quad \text{TI} \frac{}{\vdash_{\text{Ni}\square\mathcal{Z}} \Gamma \Rightarrow \top} \quad \perp E \frac{\vdash_{\text{Ni}\square\mathcal{Z}} \Gamma \Rightarrow \perp}{\vdash_{\text{Ni}\square\mathcal{Z}} \Gamma \Rightarrow \phi} \\
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 \end{array}$$

The Bellin, de Paiva and Ritter rule for $\square K$

$$\square K \frac{\vdash_{\text{Ni}\square\mathcal{Z}} \Gamma \Rightarrow \square\phi_1 \quad \dots \quad \vdash_{\text{Ni}\square\mathcal{Z}} \Gamma \Rightarrow \square\phi_n \quad \vdash_{\text{Ni}\square\mathcal{Z}} \phi_1, \dots, \phi_n \Rightarrow \psi}{\vdash_{\text{Ni}\square\mathcal{Z}} \Gamma \Rightarrow \square\psi}$$

The Sobociński-style rule for additional axioms:

$$\text{AXSB} \frac{\zeta \in \mathcal{Z} \quad s \text{ a substitution}}{\vdash_{\text{Ni}\square\mathcal{Z}} \Gamma \Rightarrow s(\zeta)}$$

our contributions II

- We show that a large class of axioms called **enveloped implications** meets the regular adequacy criterion (Th. 18/Cor. 19)

Again, syntactic proof in our calculus formalized in Coq



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our contributions II

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This much is uncontroversial, but so far we have hardly constrained IML at all. However, there are other important properties of intuitionistic logic that we expect to transfer to IML. For example, it is a general theorem that the addition of the Law of the Excluded Middle to intuitionistic logic yields classical logic.

Requirement 3. The schema $A \vee \neg A$ yields a standard classical modal logic.

39

- ▶ We show that a large class of axioms called **enveloped implications** meets the regular adequacy criterion (Th. 18/Cor. 19)

Again, syntactic proof in our calculus formalized in Coq

- ▶ We also show that for **all extensions of $i\Box R$** (strong, pure or applicative modality)
 - * **$\neg\neg$ -completeness** holds
 - * **Glivenko translation** is as good as regular ones



\mathcal{E}_{env}
valuation
 $V(p) := \emptyset$



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Requirement 3 The addition of the schema $A \vee \neg A$ to intuitionistic modal logic yields a standard classical modal logic.

§ 3: regular negative translations



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Kolmogorov's brutal saturation

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Requirement 3 The addition of the schema $A \vee \neg A$ to IML yields a standard classical modal logic.

- ▶ earliest (1925) and most straightforward one



\mathcal{E}_{a_0, a_1}
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- ▶ earliest (1925) and most straightforward one
- ▶ dump \neg onto each and every subformula

Requirement 3. The addition of the Law of the Excluded Middle $A \vee \neg A$ to IML yields a standard classical modal logic.



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
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- ▶ dump \neg onto each and every subformula
- ▶ that is:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \perp^{\text{kol}} &:= \perp & p^{\text{kol}} &:= \neg p & (\phi \wedge \psi)^{\text{kol}} &:= \neg(\phi^{\text{kol}} \wedge \psi^{\text{kol}}) \\
 (\phi \vee \psi)^{\text{kol}} &:= \neg(\phi^{\text{kol}} \vee \psi^{\text{kol}}) & (\phi \rightarrow \psi)^{\text{kol}} &:= \neg(\phi^{\text{kol}} \rightarrow \psi^{\text{kol}}) & (\Box \phi)^{\text{kol}} &:= \neg\neg\Box\phi^{\text{kol}}
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
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- ▶ more parsimoniously, the effect can be approximated “from the inside” and “from the outside”

outer route: Glivenko 1929

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Requirement 3 The addition of the schema $A \vee \neg A$ to IML yields a standard classical modal logic.

drop it on the surface and let it sink



$$\neg\neg(p \wedge (q \vee (r \rightarrow \Box s))) \Vdash_{i\Box K} \neg\neg(\neg\neg p \wedge \neg\neg(q \vee (r \rightarrow \Box s)))$$

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Empty valuation
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outer route: Glivenko 1929

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$$\begin{aligned}
 \neg(p \wedge (q \vee (r \rightarrow \Box s))) &\Vdash_{i_{\Box}K} \neg(\neg p \wedge \neg(q \vee (r \rightarrow \Box s))) \\
 &\Vdash_{i_{\Box}K} \neg(\neg p \wedge \neg(\neg q \vee \neg(r \rightarrow \Box s))) \\
 \text{ex falso here} \Rightarrow &\Vdash_{i_{\Box}K} \neg(\neg p \wedge \neg(\neg q \vee \neg(\neg r \rightarrow \neg \Box s)))
 \end{aligned}$$



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 &\dots \text{but now what?}
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ex falso here \Rightarrow

$$\Vdash_{i\Box K} \neg\neg(\neg\neg p \wedge \neg\neg(\neg\neg q \vee \neg\neg(\neg\neg r \rightarrow \neg\neg\Box s)))$$

... but now what?

The modal Double Negation Shift/Kuroda axiom

$$\text{DNS: } \Box\neg\neg p \rightarrow \neg\neg\Box p.$$

not valid in general (but valid over $i\Box R!$)

axiomatizes the same logic as $\neg\neg\Box p \leftrightarrow \neg\neg\Box\neg\neg p$

Kuroda's 1951: "saturated Glivenko"

course the converse will not be expected to hold as A may well be a theorem of IML for some modal reasons invisible to IPL.


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$$\phi_{\text{kur}} := \neg \neg \phi_{\text{kur}},$$

with $(\cdot)_{\text{kur}}$ defined as $(\Box \phi)_{\text{kur}} := \Box \neg \neg \phi_{\text{kur}}$ and identity in other inductive clauses, i.e.,

$$\begin{array}{llll} \perp_{\text{kur}} & := & \perp & p_{\text{kur}} & := & p & (\phi \wedge \psi)_{\text{kur}} & := & \phi_{\text{kur}} \wedge \psi_{\text{kur}} \\ (\phi \vee \psi)_{\text{kur}} & := & \phi_{\text{kur}} \vee \psi_{\text{kur}} & (\phi \rightarrow \psi)_{\text{kur}} & := & \phi_{\text{kur}} \rightarrow \psi_{\text{kur}} & (\Box \phi)_{\text{kur}} & := & \Box \neg \neg \phi_{\text{kur}}. \end{array}$$



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
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This is exactly as with CQC \Rightarrow IQC.

How about the "inner route"?



inner route: Gödel and Gentzen 1933

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plant \neg inside and let it grow

$$\Box(\neg\neg q \vee (\neg\neg r \rightarrow (\neg\neg p \wedge \neg\neg s))) \Vdash_{i\Box K} \Box(\neg\neg q \vee (\neg\neg r \rightarrow \neg\neg(\neg\neg p \wedge \neg\neg s)))$$



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 $V(p) := \emptyset$



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$$\begin{aligned} \Box(\neg q \vee (\neg r \rightarrow (\neg p \wedge \neg s))) &\Vdash_{i_{\Box K}} \Box(\neg q \vee (\neg r \rightarrow \neg(\neg p \wedge \neg s))) \\ &\not\Vdash_{i_{\Box K}} \Box(\neg q \vee \neg(\neg r \rightarrow \neg(\neg p \wedge \neg s))) \end{aligned}$$

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... now we need help

$$\text{e.g., } (\phi \vee \psi)^{\text{ggn}} := \neg(\phi^{\text{ggn}} \vee \psi^{\text{ggn}})$$



inner route: Gödel and Gentzen 1933

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$$\Box(\neg q \vee (\neg r \rightarrow (\neg p \wedge \neg s))) \not\vdash_{i\Box K} \Box(\neg q \vee (\neg r \rightarrow \neg(\neg p \wedge \neg s)))$$
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e.g., $(\phi \vee \psi)^{\text{ggn}} := \neg(\phi^{\text{ggn}} \vee \psi^{\text{ggn}})$

... but **unlike the predicate case**
still not enough!

$$\neg\Box\neg p \rightarrow \Box\neg p \notin i\Box K$$

Noted by Božić and Došen'84, more recently by
Holliday in his work on **possibility semantics**

Thus, saturated Gödel-Gentzen:

Intuitionistic modal logic

Of course the converse will not hold. Some modal logics hold as A may well be a theorem of IML.

$$\perp^{\text{EGGS}} := \perp \quad p^{\text{EGGS}} := \neg\neg p \quad (\phi \wedge \psi)^{\text{EGGS}} := \phi^{\text{EGGS}} \wedge \psi^{\text{EGGS}}$$

$$(\phi \vee \psi)^{\text{EGGS}} := \neg\neg(\phi^{\text{EGGS}} \vee \psi^{\text{EGGS}}) \quad (\phi \rightarrow \psi)^{\text{EGGS}} := \phi^{\text{EGGS}} \rightarrow \psi^{\text{EGGS}} \quad (\Box\phi)^{\text{EGGS}} := \neg\neg\Box\phi^{\text{EGGS}}$$

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A **regular negative translation** is a **modular translation** (Ferreira, Oliva) that uses at least as many \neg as either

- ▶ the Kuroda translation or
- ▶ the saturated Gödel-Gentzen translation,

but apart from possibly adding new occurrences of \neg , leaves everything else unchanged

e.g., no flipping polarities like Krivine(-Streicher-Reus)



Even valuation
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- ▶ The paper has a more formal definition in § 3.1
- ▶ Regular translations are equivalent to Kolmogorov



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§ 4: failure of $\neg\neg$ -completeness




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
brief recap of intuitionistic frames

- ▶ intuitionistic order \uparrow and modal relation \rightsquigarrow
- ▶ valuations \uparrow -upward closed
- ▶ clause for Heyting implication: scan all \uparrow -successors
- ▶ clause for \Box : scan all \rightsquigarrow -successors
- ▶ interaction condition:

* Minimal (Božić and Došen'84): $\uparrow; \rightsquigarrow \subseteq \rightsquigarrow; \uparrow$




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
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\mathcal{E}_{den} : a frame ...

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
\mathcal{E}_{den} valuation
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\mathcal{E}_{den} : a frame ...

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► refuting $\neg\Box\neg\neg\Box\neg\neg p \rightarrow \neg\Box\neg\neg p$



● \rightsquigarrow -irreflexive, ○ \rightsquigarrow -reflexive



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


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
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
▶ $\bar{V}(\Box\neg\neg p) = \{b_0\} = b_0\uparrow$



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
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- ▶ $\bar{V}(\Box\neg\neg p) = \{b_0\} = b_0\uparrow$
- ▶ $\bar{V}(\neg\Box\neg\neg p) = \{b_0, b_1\} = b_1\uparrow$

\mathcal{E}_{den} : a frame ...


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- ▶ refuting $\neg\Box\neg\neg\Box\neg\neg p \rightarrow \neg\Box\neg\neg p$



- ▶ just pick $V(p) := \emptyset$ and get
- ▶ $\bar{V}(\neg\neg p) = \emptyset$
- ▶ $\bar{V}(\Box\neg\neg p) = \{b_0\} = b_0\uparrow$
- ▶ $\bar{V}(\neg\Box\neg\neg p) = \{b_0, b_1\} = b_1\uparrow$
- ▶ $\bar{V}(\Box\neg\neg\Box\neg\neg p)$ is the whole thing

\mathcal{C}_{den} : a frame ...

- ▶ validating $\mathbf{C4} : \Box\Box p \rightarrow \Box p$
- ▶ refuting $\neg\neg\Box\neg\neg\Box\neg\neg p \rightarrow \neg\neg\Box\neg\neg p$




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- ▶ $\bar{V}(\neg\neg\Box\neg\neg p) = \{b_0, b_1\} = b_1\uparrow$
- ▶ $\bar{V}(\Box\neg\neg\Box\neg\neg p)$ is the whole thing
- ▶ $a_0 \not\models \neg\neg\Box\neg\neg\Box\neg\neg p \rightarrow \neg\neg\Box\neg\neg p$

similarly, \mathfrak{C}_{tr2} is a frame ...

course the converse will not be expected to hold as A may well be a theorem of IML for some modal reasons invisible to IPL.
 This much is uncontroversial, but so far we have hardly constrained the extent to which we expect to transfer to IML. For example, it is a general feature of intuitionistic logic that we might expect to transfer to IML. For example, it is a general feature of intuitionistic logic that we might expect to transfer to IML. For example, it is a general feature of intuitionistic logic that we might expect to transfer to IML.

► validating $b4 := \Box\Box p \rightarrow \Box\Box\Box p$

► refuting $\neg\Box\neg\Box\neg p \rightarrow \neg\Box\neg\Box\neg\Box\neg p$



\mathfrak{C}_{tr2} valuation
 $V(p) := \emptyset$



►

$$a_1 \uparrow = \overline{W}(\Box\neg\Box\neg p), \quad b_1 \uparrow = \overline{W}(\Box\neg p) = \overline{W}(\Box\neg\Box\neg\Box\neg p),$$

$$a_0 \uparrow = \overline{W}(p) = \overline{W}(\neg\neg p) = \overline{W}(\neg\Box\neg\Box\neg\Box\neg p), \quad b_0 \uparrow = \overline{W}(\neg\Box\neg\Box\neg p) = \overline{W}(\neg\Box\neg\Box\neg\Box\neg\Box\neg p).$$

► See Example 13 in the paper

Chapter 3. Intuitionistic modal logic

Of course the converse will not be true. It is possible to IPL, and as A may well be a theorem of IML for some modal logics, but we have hardly constrained IML at all.

However, there are some important properties of intuitionistic logic that we might expect to transfer to IML. For example, it is a general feature of intuitionistic logics that the addition of the Law of the Excluded Middle gives rise to the corresponding classical logics. So we might expect:

Requirement 3 The addition of the schema $A \vee \neg A$ to IML yields a standard classical modal logic.

► These counterexamples were well-behaved in at least one sense



\mathcal{E}_{a_0, b_1}
valuation
 $V(p) := \emptyset$



Of course the converse will not be true...
However, the...
expect to transfer to IML. For example...
that the addition of...
classical logic... we might expect:

► These counterexamples were well-behaved in at least one sense

► Recall that our problem is:

given $\zeta \in \mathcal{L}_{\square}$, is there any ϕ s.t.
 $\phi \in \mathbf{c}_{\square}\mathbf{K} + \zeta$ but $\phi^t \notin \mathbf{i}_{\square}\mathbf{K} + \zeta$

Requirement 3 The addition of the schema $A \vee \neg A$ to IML yields a standard classical modal logic.



Empty valuation $V(p) := \emptyset$



Of course the converse will not be true. It is not possible to IPL as A may well be a theorem of IML for some modal logic M . However, the converse does hold for intuitionistic modal logics that we might expect to translate to IML. For example, the Excluded Middle principle that we might expect to translate to IML. For example, the Excluded Middle principle that we might expect to translate to IML.

► These counterexamples were well-behaved in at least one sense

► Recall that our problem is:

given $\zeta \in \mathcal{L}_{\square}$, is there **any** ϕ s.t.

$\phi \in \mathbf{c}_{\square}\mathbf{K} + \zeta$ but $\phi^t \notin \mathbf{i}_{\square}\mathbf{K} + \zeta$

► In both cases, we just took $\phi = \zeta$



Empty valuation $V(p) := \emptyset$



Of course the converse will not be true. It is not possible to add as a theorem of IML for some modal logic L that is weaker than IPL. However, the above properties of intuitionistic modal logic have hardly been expected to transfer to IML. For example, it is not clear that we might expect to transfer to IML. Excluded Middle gives us a classical logic that we might expect to transfer to IML. For example, it is not clear that we might expect to transfer to IML. Excluded Middle gives us a classical logic that we might expect to transfer to IML.

- ▶ These counterexamples were well-behaved in at least one sense

▶ Recall that our problem is:

given $\zeta \in \mathcal{L}_{\square}$, is there **any** ϕ s.t.

$$\phi \in \mathbf{c}_{\square}\mathbf{K} + \zeta \text{ but } \phi^t \notin \mathbf{i}_{\square}\mathbf{K} + \zeta$$

- ▶ In both cases, we just took $\phi = \zeta$
- ▶ Can it happen that ζ wouldn't yield a counterexample, but some other ϕ would?



Empty valuation $V(p) := \emptyset$



Of course the converse will not be true. It is possible to find a model of IML for some modal logic that is not intuitionistic. However, the converse does not hold. We have hardly considered the possibility that the addition of intuitionistic modal logic to IPL might yield a theory that we might expect to transfer to IML. For example, the Excluded Middle principle is not intuitionistic, but it is classical. We might expect:

► These counterexamples were well-behaved in at least one sense

► Recall that our problem is:

given $\zeta \in \mathcal{L}_{\Box}$, is there **any** ϕ s.t.

$$\phi \in \mathbf{c}_{\Box}\mathbf{K} + \zeta \text{ but } \phi^t \notin \mathbf{i}_{\Box}\mathbf{K} + \zeta$$

- In both cases, we just took $\phi = \zeta$
- Can it happen that ζ wouldn't yield a counterexample, but some other ϕ would?
- **No**—and this is what the first of our main results (Regular Adequacy) is saying!



Empty valuation $V(p) := \emptyset$



Of course the converse will not be expected to hold as A may well be a theorem of IML for some modal reasons invisible to IPL.

This much is uncontroversial, but so far we have hardly constrained IML at all. However, there are other important properties of intuitionistic logic that we might expect to transfer to IML. For example, it is a general feature of intuitionistic logics that the addition of the Law of the Excluded Middle gives rise to the corresponding classical logics. So we might expect:

Requirement 3 The addition of the scheme $A \vee \neg A$ to intuitionistic logic yields a standard classical modal logic.

§ 5: what axioms are $\neg\neg$ -complete?



enveloped implications

$s_{\neg\neg}(\beta)$: a substitution replacing all p occurring in β by their double negations



\mathcal{E}_{en}
valuation
 $V(p) := \emptyset$



enveloped implications

$s_{\neg\neg}(\beta)$: a substitution replacing all p occurring in β by their double negations

a $(\neg\neg)$ pre-envelope
(in $i_{\square}\mathcal{Z}$)

or env-consequent



env valuation
 $V(p) := \emptyset$



enveloped implications

$s_{\neg\neg}(\beta)$: a substitution replacing all p occurring in β by their double negations

a $(\neg\neg)$ pre-envelope
(in $i_{\square}\mathcal{Z}$)

or env-consequent

a $(\neg\neg)$ post-envelope
(in $i_{\square}\mathcal{Z}$)

or env-antecedent

$$\beta^{\text{kol}} \vdash_{i_{\square}\mathcal{Z}} \neg\neg s_{\neg\neg}(\beta)$$



enveloped implications

$s_{\neg\neg}(\beta)$: a substitution replacing all p occurring in β by their double negations

a $(\neg\neg)$ pre-envelope
(in $i_{\square}\mathcal{Z}$)

or env-consequent

a $(\neg\neg)$ post-envelope
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or env-antecedent

an $\neg\neg$ -envelope
(in $i_{\square}\mathcal{Z}$)

$$\beta^{\text{kol}} \vdash_{i_{\square}\mathcal{Z}} \neg\neg s_{\neg\neg}(\beta)$$

$$\neg\neg s_{\neg\neg}(\beta) \Vdash_{i_{\square}\mathcal{Z}} \beta^{\text{kol}}$$



enveloped implications

$s_{\neg\neg}(\beta)$: a substitution replacing all p occurring in β by their double negations

a $(\neg\neg)$ pre-envelope
(in $i_{\Box}\mathcal{Z}$)

or env-consequent

a $(\neg\neg)$ post-envelope
(in $i_{\Box}\mathcal{Z}$)

or env-antecedent

an $\neg\neg$ -envelope
(in $i_{\Box}\mathcal{Z}$)

an enveloped implication

$$\beta^{\text{kol}} \vdash_{i_{\Box}\mathcal{Z}} \neg\neg s_{\neg\neg}(\beta)$$

$$\neg\neg s_{\neg\neg}(\beta) \Vdash_{i_{\Box}\mathcal{Z}} \beta^{\text{kol}}$$

$\beta \rightarrow \gamma$, where:

β a post-envelope

γ a pre-envelope



lemma 17 & theorem 18

39

course the converse will not be expected to hold as A may well be a theorem of IML for some modal reasons invisible to IPL.

This much is uncontroversial, but so far we have hardly constrained IML. However, there are other important properties of intuitionistic logics that we might expect to transfer to IML. For example, Excluded Middle gives rise to the corresponding classical $\dashv\vdash$ we might expect:

Requirement 3 The addition of the schema $A \vee \neg A$ to IML yields a standard classical modal logic.

► A box-free formula is a $\dashv\vdash$ -envelope



\mathcal{E}_{a_0}
valuation
 $V(p) := \emptyset$



lemma 17 & theorem 18

- ▶ A box-free formula is a $\neg\neg$ -envelope
- ▶ A shallow formula with no disjunction under box is a $\neg\neg$ -envelope



Empty valuation
 $V(p) := \emptyset$



lemma 17 & theorem 18

- ▶ A **box-free** formula is a $\neg\neg$ -envelope
- ▶ A **shallow** formula with no disjunction under box is a $\neg\neg$ -envelope
- ▶ An **implication-free** formula is a **pre-envelope** (env-consequent)



Env-valuation
 $V(p) := \emptyset$



lemma 17 & theorem 18

- ▶ A **box-free** formula is a **$\neg\neg$ -envelope**
- ▶ A **shallow** formula with no disjunction under box is a **$\neg\neg$ -envelope**
- ▶ An **implication-free** formula is a **pre-envelope (env-consequent)**
- ▶ A negation of a pre-envelope is a post-envelope



env-valuation
 $V(p) := \emptyset$

lemma 17 & theorem 18

- ▶ A **box-free** formula is a **$\neg\neg$ -envelope**
 - ▶ A **shallow formula** with no disjunction under box is a **$\neg\neg$ -envelope**
 - ▶ An **implication-free** formula is a **pre-envelope (env-consequent)**
 - ▶ A negation of a pre-envelope is a post-envelope
- Any logic axiomatized by enveloped implications is $\neg\neg$ -complete**



applications (corollary 19)

\neg -completeness holds for logics axiomatized over $i_{\Box}K$ by combinations of the following axioms

(cf. Sotirov'84, Th. 10 and Litak'14, Tab. 2)

R	$p \rightarrow \Box p,$	CB	$\Box p \rightarrow (q \rightarrow p) \vee q,$	bem	$\Box p \vee \Box \neg p,$
4	$\Box p \rightarrow \Box \Box p,$	NV	$\neg \Box \perp,$	emb	$\Box p \vee \neg \Box p,$
T	$\Box p \rightarrow p,$	NNV	$\neg \neg \Box \perp,$	$T \neg$	$\Box p \rightarrow \neg \neg p,$
coK	$(\Box p \rightarrow \Box q) \rightarrow \Box(p \rightarrow q),$	bR	$p \rightarrow \Box \Box p,$	$T \neg$	$\Box \neg p \rightarrow \neg p,$
bLin	$\Box(p \rightarrow q) \vee \Box(q \rightarrow p),$	Linb	$(\Box p \rightarrow q) \vee (\Box q \rightarrow p),$	wemb \neg	$\neg \Box p \vee \neg \Box \neg p,$

or any superintuitionistic axiom, i.e., a formula in modality-free \mathcal{L}

An example of a standard logic obtained by a such combination:

$$i_{\Box}S4 = i_{\Box}4 + T$$

Of course the converse will not be expected to hold as A may well be a theorem of IML for some modal reasons invisible to IPL.

This much is uncontroversial, but so far we have hardly constrained IML at all. However, there are other important properties of intuitionistic logic that we might expect to transfer to IML. For example, it is a general feature of intuitionistic logics that the addition of the Law of the Excluded Middle gives rise to the corresponding classical logics. So we might expect:

Requirement 3 The addition of the scheme $A \vee \neg A$ to $V(p) = \emptyset$ yields a standard classical modal logic.

§ 6: Glivenko for strength and purity



Of course, it is not to be expected to hold as A may well be a theorem of IPL, for modal reasons invisible to IPL.

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Requirement 3 The addition of the schema $A \vee \neg A$ to IML yields a standard classical modal logic.

► The modal Double Negation Shift/Kuroda axiom



\mathcal{E}_{a_0, b_1}
valuation
 $V(p) := \emptyset$



Of course, it is not to be expected of IML for modal reasons invisible to us.

► The modal Double Negation Shift/Kuroda axiom

DNS: $\Box \neg \neg p \rightarrow \neg \neg \Box p.$

A may well be a theorem

This much is uncontroversial, but so far we have hardly constrained IML at all. However, there are other important properties of intuitionistic logic that we might expect to transfer to IML. For example, it is a general feature of intuitionistic logics that the addition of the Law of the Excluded Middle gives rise to the corresponding classical logics. So we might expect:

Requirement 3 *The addition of the schema $A \vee \neg A$ to IML yields a standard classical modal logic.*



\mathcal{E}_{DNS}
valuation
 $V(p) := \emptyset$



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axiomatizes the same logic as $\neg \neg \Box p \leftrightarrow \neg \neg \Box \neg \neg p$ (Lem. 20)

► An analogue of an observation in Troelstra & van Dalen:

in any extension of i_{\Box} DNS, the Glivenko translation becomes equivalent to the regular ones/Kolmogorov, i.e.,

for every ϕ , we have that: $\vdash_{i_{\Box}\text{DNS}} \phi^{\text{kol}} \leftrightarrow \phi^{\text{glv}}$



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Any t saturating **glv** is adequate for any extension of i_{\Box} DNS (Th. 22)



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Any t saturating **glv** is adequate for any extension of i_{\Box} DNS (Th. 22)

► DNS is a theorem of i_{\Box} R (Th. 23)

The derivation has a rather CPS-like flavour ...



valuation $V(p) := \emptyset$

Future work and challenges

► Semantic characterizations in terms of stability under

↑-cofinal subframes



Future work and challenges

- ▶ Semantic characterizations in terms of stability under \uparrow -cofinal subframes
- ▶ Relate to similar work syntactically investigating negative translations (mostly Glivenko) for classes of **substructural** logics (Ono or Ono & Farahani)
- ▶ Extend to \diamond , to Krivine(-Streicher-Reus) ...

Note that G. Bezhaniashvili showed that Glivenko works for MIPC



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- ▶ Replace \neg by other nuclei/monads

Connection to Aczel's *The Russell-Prawitz modality* and Escardó & Oliva's *The Peirce Translation and the Double Negation Shift*



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- ▶ Extend, reuse the Coq framework and possibly merge with other developments

```
git clone git://git8.cs.fau.de/dnegmod
```

```
https://cal8.cs.fau.de/redmine/projects/dnegmod
```



Even valuation
 $V(p) := \emptyset$

Bonus track

course the converse will not be true. In fact, as A may well be a theorem of IML for some modal logics, the converse of the above result is false. However, there are many important properties of intuitionistic logic that we might expect to transfer to IML. For example, it is a general feature of intuitionistic logics that the addition of the Law of the Excluded Middle gives rise to the corresponding classical logics. So we might expect:

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► **\uparrow -cofinal subframes** are, of course, cofinal wrt intuitionistic accessibility relation \uparrow




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► **Duals of such subframes share the same algebra of $\neg\neg$ -closed elements with the dual of the original subframe**



Bonus track

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- ▶ However, there is something flawed about the connection with Wolter's **describable operations**

At least as long as we want the operation to be described by the negative translation

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► Another route: focus just on the algebra of $\neg\neg$ -closed elements ...

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
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► Another route: focus just on the algebra of $\neg\neg$ -closed elements ...

► ...drop half of Wolter's "C I" condition ...

► ...the notion of **$C(W)$ -variety**: $C(W) \subseteq W$